- Japan’s Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) has been told the emergency operation manual for Fukushima #1 was not followed. NHK allegedly has a copy of the emergency manual, and it reveals several key violations of emergency procedures. By procedure, the primary containment’s suppression chamber is to be manually vented to the outside air at ~2 times it’s operating limit (120 psi) if automatic venting fails (which it did?). As it turns out, Prime Minister Kan’s order to vent unit #1 as soon as possible on March 12 was to try and accelerate the execution of manual pressure relief. The pressure inside the #1 torus was at the manual relief trigger point for 6.5 hours before venting began. Pressures at the point of venting was at least four times the torus’ design limits. Radioactive steam must have streamed out of the torus through weak points (such as instrument penetrations) and into the secondary containment. This may well be the source of the hydrogen which exploded in the #1 upper refueling deck on March 12. Former Japanese nuclear engineer, Masashi Goto, says that if the venting would have started at the prescribed pressure, the hydrogen explosion could have been avoided in Unit #1. This writer totally agrees.Regardless, the explosion occurred more than six hours after the venting began, which in most interesting. Did it take that long for the hydrogen released to the secondary containment to migrate to the upper level and concentrate? One must also wonder if similar emergency procedure violations occurred with units #2 & 3? Could the “abnormal noise” reported for unit#2 suppression chamber on March 15 have been a result of steam being released by a severe over-pressure condition?
- Sunday’s Japan Times reports Prime Minister Kan wanted the cooling sea water flow to reactor pressure vessel (RPV) #1 stopped on the morning of March 12, causing TEPCO operators to stop sea water injection. After an hour, the operators re-started sea water cooling flow. Kan’s staff maintains the Chairman of Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) told him the use of sea water for cooling could cause “recriticality”…the restart of a fission chain reaction. Haruki Madarame, Chairman of the Commission, denied he made any such claim to Kan. Madarame told Kyodo News, ”It is unlikely for me, as an expert, to say such a thing. I feel quite upset about that.” This morning, Asahi Shimbun reports Kan himself denies giving TEPCO an order to stop the seawater injection. He says he was concerned about recriticality, but merely asked NSC to investigate into the possibility. Kyodo News quotes Kan saying he never received a response from NSC, ”I cannot have said ‘stop’ with regard to something that had not been reported to me.” Even if Kan issued no “instruction” for seawater flow to stop, TEPCO certainly understood him to be making just such a suggestion, at the very least.On Sunday, Japan Times reported growing criticism toward Kan’s decision and that, “a delay in the seawater injection may have caused a meltdown in the reactor.” This morning, Asahi Shimbun reports that the President of Japan’s Upper House, Takao Nishioka, has asked for Kan to resign. In Japan, it is literally unheard-of for the head of one branch of government to ask for the resignation of the head of another branch. Nishioka calls Kan’s responses to the quake/tsunami disaster and the nuclear emergency at Fukushima “inept”. He cites slow public safety responses to the tsunami, and a failure to disclose timely information concerning the status of reactor #1 on March 11 & 12. Nishioka also calls for the Lower House to pass a “no confidence” vote if Kan refuses to step down. This would legally compel Kan to resign. Asahi Shimbun says Nishioka’s move is “making the House look like an arena of political conflict”, and admonishes him for doing something that violates past political practices. Asahi Shimbun calls for unity in the government, not conflict, at this critical point in Japanese history.
- NHK News reports TEPCO denies the earthquake caused any “safety abnormalities” at Fukushima Daiichi on March 11. TEPCO’s operating staff had fully functional instrumentation and emergency operational control for the ~1 hour time period between the quake and tsunami. After the tsunami struck and stopped all emergency electricity flow, data became sporadic and unreliable, aggravated by minimal communication capabilities between the four unit’s operating staffs. TEPCO says it has taken them more than two months to get all the information together to make this determination. The question now emerges… why has it taken them so long?
- NHK also reports that work has begun to reinforce the bottom of the spent fuel pool (SPF) in unit #4. TEPCO says this reinforcement is two-fold. First, it ought to be done before installing a new SPF cooling system. Second, it will insure the SPF will not lose integrity should another massive quake/tsunami hit.
- TEPCO reports they have reduced cooling water flow to unit #1 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) through the “fire extinction system” down to 3 tons per hour, but increased water flow via feedwater piping to 12 tons per hour. As a result, water temperatures at the feedwater nozzle and RPV bottom head have dropped below 110oC for the first time in two months. The other two RPV’s temperatures seem to have stabilized, which means the feedwater injection rates have finally been adjusted such that temperatures remain constant.
- JAIF now reports the water level in RPV #1 is below what used to be the fuel cell in the reactor. They are assuming a full meltdown with all of the core materials in the fuel cell mixed together and located in the bottom head of the RPV. Bottom head temperature readings indicate the corium (melted mixture) is being adequately cooled by water injections. They also report that the fuel cells in units #2 and 3 are either partially or fully uncovered with water. They continue to maintain that there is 35% meltage in RPV #2, and 30% meltage in RPV #3. This writer continues to suggest that #3 RPV has the worst damage of the two, and is quite possibly a full meltdown of Unit #1 proportions.
- NHK News reports that the removal of debris from the exteriors of the four tandem reactor buildings at Fukushima is hampering TEPCO’s ability to provide new cooling systems for the reactors. This should come as no surprise to anyone, but does show that the events at Fukushima Daiichi have wound down to the point that the news media is literally scraping the bottom of the barrel to keep Fukushima “in the news”.
- TEPCO reports that the seawater sampling point 30 meters north of their enclosed port/quay now shows a cesium 134/137 isotopic concentration slightly above health standards. All other sampling points are below standards, with most not showing detectable cesium levels. All sampling points, however, show no detectable iodine-131.
- All Japanese news media outlets have reported the discovery of five broken sea water tubes inside the condenser of the recently shut down Hamaoka #5 NPS. Most reports make it sound like radiation has been leaking through the pipes and into the atmosphere. However, this is impossible. The condensation of steam exhausted from the turbines creates an internal vacuum similar to outer space. Thus, any leakage was into, not out of the condenser. After shutdown, the source of radioactive steam is gone.
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