- UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon says the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi was due to poor hazard assessments of natural disasters. Ki-moon has released a 43 page report on the Fukushima accident, detailing his staff’s assessment. The report concludes, “The principal lesson of the Fukushima accident is that assumptions made concerning which types of accident were possible or likely were too modest.” The document also says, “Contaminated areas may not be able to grow crops or support livestock grazing as a result of the persistence of radionuclides such as cesium-137 for decades.” Finally the UN points out that a nuclear accident could have a negative impact on food trade, “which arises not only from imposed food restrictions in certain areas, but also from consumers’ reluctance to consume some foods because of public fears of radioactive contamination.” (i.e., The Hiroshima Syndrome)Nearly all Japanese news media have posted a version of the story. Yet none, including the U.N. Report itself, mention the Fukushima control room (MCR) records, released in July, which show that despite inadequate accident prevention measures, all meltdown and hydrogen explosions could have been avoided. Procedural restrictions, naïve bureaucratic decisions, and over-confidence in the containment structure’s toughness, combined to delay the depressurization of unit #1 for eight or more hours. This delay resulted in the unit #1 meltdown and the hydrogen explosion which doomed units #2 and #3. Without the delay, it is likely all meltdowns and hydrogen explosions would not have happened.
- In addition to the above, JAIF reports JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency) computer simulations show that if venting and the restart of cooling water flow to unit #2 would have happened 4 hours sooner, it’s meltdown would have been averted. This 4-hour-earlier recovery action would have kept the fuel cell below 1,200 oC, avoiding hydrogen generation and cladding damage, and (of course) meltdown. Group leader Masashi Hirano says that he wonders why TEPCO did not start injecting water earlier despite their power difficulties. TEPCO says it doesn’t believe the operation was delayed, adding that workers did their best amid high radiation levels and other severe conditions.
- Asahi Shimbun reports Japan’s principle nuclear regulatory agency, NISA, compiled a document at 1pm on March 12, which predicted a massive radiological release if the unit #1 containment were not vented. The document says venting did not occur until about 2pm, which totally contradicts the control room (MCR) records. The MCR entries say venting began at 10:17am, and was confirmed by the main gate radiation monitor’s increased reading at 10:40am. At 11:15, main gate radiation levels decreased, indicating the venting had been interrupted. At 2pm, a second venting began and continued until the hydrogen explosion at 3:36pm. Regardless, NISA’s announcement fails to mention that by 1pm, it was already too late to save the plant. Meltdown had fully progressed and the leakage of hydrogen into the outer reactor building had advanced to the point where an explosion was inevitable. The Asahi makes the following ridiculous observation based on their interpretation of the report, “However, from about 2:30 p.m., pressure within the containment vessel began to decrease, and the specter of a large volume of radioactive materials being released was avoided.”Is anyone at NISA cross-referencing their own records? And, The Asahi’s failure to consider the massive rad release from the 3:36 explosion…is that their version of “avoided”? We wonder…
- JAIF/NHK World report TEPCO has begun injecting water into unit #2 RPV to copy the method used recently to lower the temperature inside unit #3 RPV. That is, water is being fed through the central feedwater spray line as well as the peripheral feedwater supply line. If this lowers temperature in unit #2 RPV, TEPCO will reduce the peripheral injection rate similar to what has been done with unit #3. As of this morning, unit #2 temperatures are decreasing.
- TEPCO reports analyses of 13 locations inside the seawater break-wall (quay) for Cesium. Currently, only two show Cesium levels slightly above Japan’s standards, 3 below standards and six locations are non-detectable. We believe the Cesium is being chemically bound to minerals in the seawater and the resulting products are precipitating onto the sea bed inside the quay.
- TEPCO’s atmospheric readings show levels 1000 to 10,000 times lower than health standards for airborne Cesium. No…that is not a typo! So much for the allegations that massive radiation is still leaking out of the plant!
- Kyodo News reports Yuichi Moriguchi, a professor at the University of Tokyo, saying up to 2,000 square kilometers of Fukushima Prefecture need de-contamination. He also says 70% of that land area is forest. Using the government-published radiation map, Moriguchi identified the areas having a 1 msv/hr or higher exposure rate. He estimates that decontaminating everything, including the forests, will create 1 million cubic meters of radioactive waste. The low level waste issue is bubbling up in Japan. Vocal residents don’t trust local officials and the local officials don’t trust Tokyo. Asahi Shimbun calls for an independent committee of experts to handle the issue.How much of the material will be less radioactive that openly disposed-of coal plant fly ash? We feel most of it would be have lower rad levels than the coal ash but that’s merely a guess.
- Cabinet Minister Yukio Edano says it is unlikely that the undamaged units 5 & 6 at Fukushima Daiichi and the four at Fukushima Daini will ever be restarted. Edano said the government will try to disclose the cause of the nuclear accident in a more appropriate manner, but the damage caused by the Kan government may have made nuke restarts impossible in Fukushima Prefecture. Mainichi Shimbun reports distrust among the public about government information disclosure as the reason municipalities hosting idled nukes are reluctant to allow restarts.
- In a directly related story, Japan Times says Fukui governor Issei Nishikawa will not extend retsart permission to the 14 idled nukes in his Prefecture, even if they all pass the stress tests. He demands the causes of the Fukushima Daiichi accident be concretely understood, and the lessons learned to result in safety upgrades, before he gives his OK. He also wants the new government to create a rule on how long reactors more than 40 years old should be allowed to continue operation. Nishikawa criticized how the nuclear crisis was handled under Prime Minister Naoto Kan and the abrupt introduction of reactor stress tests, saying they were done in an “impromptu” manner.
- Japan’s newest 43 page report to the IAEA on the accident at Fukushima (Additional Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA; September 2011) is full of typographic errors and abundant with less-than-full-disclosure statements. The volume of examples is nigh-legion. How about one example of each? (1) Typo = Page 5 says Isolation Cooling Condenser operation for unit #1 was stopped before the tsunami hit because RPV temperature was too high. The statement is contradictory on the surface (shut off cooling because it’s too hot??), but a check of #2 MCR records shows the shutdown was in order to control RPV pressure. (2) Less-then-full-disclosure = Page 8 – on unit #2 “venting” of containment pressure – identifies the operator’s efforts to make it happen, but never mentions that all efforts failed and unit #2 was never operator-vented! The severe loss of primary containment integrity at ~6am on March 14, is what caused the depressurization. The operators had nothing to do with it!
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