Are those closest to the Fukushima Daiichi situation overlooking the obvious, or is there something sinister happening? On Saturday, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported Tepco has blamed containment damaged to unit #2 as the major source of radioactive releases on March 15, 2011. Tepco says about 1,000 Tera-Becquerels (TBq) were released with the unit #1 explosion on March 12, and less than 5,000 TBqs released with the unit #3 explosion of March 14. Tepco reports releases suddenly swelled to 160,000 TBqs on March 15, and they blame it on leaks from seams and “other parts” inside the containment of unit #2 when it was over-pressurized. On March 16, the biggest release occurred, at 180,000 TBqs, largely from unit #3.

There seems to be two glaring errors in their prognostications. First, there was no hydrogen explosion with unit #2, which is now understood to have had the least fuel damage of the three meltdowns. The unit #2 reactor building was not compromised and remains intact, with only the relatively small “blow-out panel” open to allow radioactive gasses to escape. The other two buildings literally had nothing to restrict atmospheric releases once they experienced their hydrogen detonations. In addition, with lesser fuel damage than the other two units, the amount of radioactive isotopes escaping unit #2’s fuel-itself would also be less than units #3&4. Unit #2 had the most restrictive pathway for release and the lowest concentration of radioactive material available.

The second error flummoxes this writer. On March 15 unit #4 experienced its hydrogen explosion. The hydrogen for the explosion came from unit #3, which must necessarily have brought considerable radioactive material along with it. There is no mention of unit #4’s explosive contribution to the March 15 release. In fact, Tepco seems to be trying to deflect all possible interest away from unit #4 as a possible radioactive release source by saying there was no damage to the unit #4 core. Of course there wasn’t any #4 fuel damage since the reactor was shut down, cooled down, depressurized and all fuel was in its spent fuel pool. Tepco seems to be avoiding the obvious because of the current unit #4 spent fuel pool controversy that has swept the international Press. There is no doubt that the unit #4 detonation was caused by inter-unit leakage from unit #3. The fuel in #4 SPF had nothing to do with it. There can also be no logical doubt that much, if not most of the March 15 surge in radioactive releases from F. Daiichi came from the unit #4 explosion. Was there enough radioactive material from unit #3 to cause the releases for both March 15th and 16th? Since there was enough hydrogen from unit #3 to demolish two robustly-built, steel and concrete outer structures, there must have been enough radiological material for two days of releases, as well. This does not mean unit #2 is not a contributor to both-day’s-worth of releases, but it was in no way the primary reason for the March 15th release. Unless the unit #4 release caused by its hydrogen explosion is included in the scenario, it’s clearly a white-wash of reality-itself.

The current controversy with unit #4 SPF is as fantasy-predicated as it gets. Fear of adding to the apocalyptic hullabaloo by deflecting the world’s attention away from the truth is totally non-transparent. Tepco has spent nearly a year trying to recapture the world’s trust. This could generate a whole new level of suspicion.