- Fukushima governor Yuhei Sato’s criticisms of the government’s response to the Fukushima accident continue. In his testimony before the Diet’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) Sato said Tokyo’s escalating evacuation orders in March, 2011, were confounding, “We had no prior notice. No grounds for the instructions were presented and the instructions were announced one after another. It was totally beyond us.” In nuclear emergency drills, Tokyo was expected to issue a nuclear emergency declaration 30 minutes after the causal situation was discovered. However, it took more than 4 hours on 3/11/11. “But in this accident, the declaration was announced about 2-1/2 hours after receiving the report from Tokyo Electric Power Co. It was another hour later when the notice arrived at the prefectural government,” Sato explained, “I determined that if we waited for the central government to act, we could not have protected the safety of residents. So I asked residents in a two-kilometer radius of the plant to evacuate.” But, Tokyo then began to issue evacuation orders unilaterally, never seeking input from Sato or any other local official. The central government determined the 20 km radius (no-go zone) entirely on its own. Sato the offered his perspective on Tokyo’s actions, “Evacuation instructions for a radius of more than 10 kilometers were not assumed in the nuclear disaster prevention plan. About 80,000 residents in that radius and other parts of the prefecture who felt anxious were forced to evacuate to places both inside and outside of the prefecture.” Further, the SPEEDI system for predicting the atmospheric dispersal of radioactive releases was never used, which made Tokyo’s determination of who would evacuate largely arbitrary. Sato said that SPEEDI data was “carelessly overlooked” by both Tokyo and his own office. Sato’s statement was echoed by other Fukushima officials. Okuma Mayor Toshitsuna Watanabe said, “The central government’s crisis-management systems did not work. I wanted the prefectural government to provide correct information speedily.” Naraha Mayor Yukiei Matsumoto added, “The responsibility is heavy for the failure to quickly relay the radiation information about contamination conditions to municipal governments.” (Yomiuri Shimbun)
- The head of the Union of Kansai Governments said it will accept any decision the government makes on restarting Oi units 3&4. Hyogo Gov. Toshizo Ido, head of the group, said, “We will accept the government’s decision.” The announcement was made after the group met with PM Noda and three of his cabinet officials, explaining the government’s reasons for wanting the restarts. Following the meeting, the Union issued a statement saying, “On the assumption that the government’s safety judgment is provisional, we call on it to make a definitive judgment.” Disaster minister Goshi Hosono spoke of concessions made to the Union during the meeting, “In the event of an emergency, we will link the Oi nuclear power plant, Kansai Electric, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the prime minister’s office via a videoconferencing system.” (Japan Times)
- It’s possible that the Oi nukes will be restarted in June. PM Noda and his cabinet ministers feel the local support for restart is growing. Noda says, “We are seeing some understanding from the relevant local governments. If we can gain their approval we’ll discuss the issue at a ministers’ meeting. In the end, I’ll make the final decision.” Hyogo Gov. Toshizo Ido, head of the Kansai Union, told reporters, “We’ll leave the decision to the central government. We don’t need to take any further action.” In a cautionary statement, Fukui Gov. Issei Nishikawa said, “It’s important for the prime minister to give a clear explanation to the public.” (Yomiuri Shimbun)
- In a sudden, unexpected reversal, Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto now says he will approve the reactivation of the Oi nukes. His change is believed to be due to the real possibility of electric shortages in Osaka this coming summer. “It is extremely difficult as the individual in charge of local administration to have a precondition of a 15-percent shortage,” the mayor said. Hashimoto came under pressure at a meeting on May 15, when the heads of three Kansai regional economic organizations raised concerns about electricity shortages. In a related reversal of opinion, Shiga Governor Yukiko Kada says that she is leaning toward allowing the Oi restart. She said the concerns raised by local business leaders were the primary reasons she was changing her position. (Japan Times)
- A new survey shows that 64% of the people in Oi town support the nuke restarts. However, 60% of them felt the government’s handling of the debate was a negative. The survey also shows that 55% of the residents in four neighboring communities and the city of Osaka are not in favor. 74% of the “neighbors” had a negative opinion of the government’s role in the restart issue. (NHK World)
- Prime Minister Noda says restarting Oi units 3&4 are necessary. All he needs to give his consent is approval from the Oi town mayor and the Fukui governor. “If we get a decision by local authorities, then we will discuss among the four key ministers and I will make the final decision,” Noda told reporters. The Kansai Union said current safety standards were provisional but sufficient until the new nuclear regulatory agency is launched. The Diet has finally begun formal debate on the issue and it seems Tokyo is headed in the right direction. Greenpeace International continues to oppose any restarts saying, “Our consistent position is that this is being rushed.” (Japan Times, WSJ Japan Realtime)
- Ex-PM Naoto Kan admitted to the NAIIC that he was ignorant of Japanese disaster law before 3/11/11. “When it comes to the specific responsibilities and authorities given to the Prime Minister (PM), when a nuclear accident takes place, I do not recall being briefed before or directly after the accident,” Kan testified, “When it comes to the specific responsibilities and authorities given to a PM, when a nuclear accident takes place, as a head of the counter-measure headquarters, after I became PM until the accident took place, I do not recall any situation where I was briefed on those points. I admit that as the head of the counter-measure headquarters, yes, I should have been briefed more deeply about my responsibilities and authority.” In other words, he refuses to take responsibility for his ignorance of Japanese law on nuclear calamities (and disastrous tsunamis), but rather points to his advisors as culprits. In addition, he denies that the delay in issuing an emergency declaration was intentional, “I did not postpone the issuance of the declaration. The request was made to me at 5:42 for my approval of the declaration, on the other side, the meeting of the opposition party leaders was taking place, to which I was committed to participate, so it took one hour and 21 minutes to declare the emergency state.” The question remains – what was more important? A routine political meeting or a nuclear accident declaration? Obviously, Kan felt routine politics took priority. (Japan Subculture Research Center)
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